CI is often misunderstood and narrowly equated with security and catching spies, which are only part of the picture. As William R. Johnson explains, CI is the art of actively protecting secrets but also aggressively thwarting, penetrating, and deceiving hostile intelligence organizations to neutralize or even manipulate their operations.Johnson, a career CIA intelligence officer, lucidly presents the nuts and bolts of the business of counterintelligence and the characteristics that make a good CI officer. Although written during the late Cold War, this book continues to be useful for intelligence professionals, scholars, and students because the basic principles of CI are largely timeless. General readers will enjoy the lively narrative and detailed descriptions of tradecraft that reveal the real world of intelligence and espionage. A new foreword by former CIA officer and noted author William Hood provides a contemporary perspective on this valuable book and its author.

    Richelson walks us down the corridors of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and through the four decades of science, scientists, and managers that produced the CIA we have today. He tells a story of amazing technological innovation in service of intelligence gathering, of bitter bureaucratic infighting, and sometimes, as in the case of its “mind-control” adventure, of stunning moral failure. Based on original interviews and extensive archival research, The Wizards of Langley turns a piercing lamp on many of the agency’s activities, many never before made public.

    and a former U.S. intelligence official) presents an academic introduction to the history and current role of intelligence agencies in the foreign policy of the United States. He surveys the growth of the intelligence agencies, examines their place in the general structure of government, reviews policy debates about the scope and nature of intelligence activities, and discusses intelligence reforms. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

    Five hundred billion dollars of spending in the Bush-Cheney years turned the U.S. spy network into a monster: 200,000-plus employees, stations in 170 countries, and an annual budget of more than $75 billion. Armed with cutting-edge surveillance gear, high-tech weapons, and fleets of armed and unarmed drone aircraft, America deploys the most advanced intel force in history. But even after the celebrated strike against Osama Bin Laden, America's spies are still struggling to beat a host of ragtag enemies around the world. In Intel Wars, preeminent secrecy and intelligence historian Matthew Aid ("our reigning expert on the NSA"-Seymour M. Hersh) delivers the inside stories of how and why our shadow war against extremism has floundered. Spendthrift, schizophrenic policies leave next-generation spy networks drowning in raw data, resource-starved, and choked on paperwork. Overlapping jurisdictions stall CIA operatives, who wait seventy-two hours for clearance to attack fast-moving Taliban IE D teams. U.S. military computers-their classified hard drives still in place-turn up for sale at Afghan bazaars. Swift, tightly focused operations like the Bin Laden strike are the exception rather than the rule. Intel Wars-based on extensive, on-the-ground interviews, and revelations from Wikileaks cables and other newly declassified documents-shows how our soldier-spies are still fighting to catch up with the enemy. Matthew Aid captures the lumbering behemoth that is the U.S. military-intelligence complex in one comprehensive narrative, and distills the unprecedented challenges to our security into a compelling- and sobering-read.

    In countering asymmetric threats and non-state adversaries, the model is simply outmoded. A flatter, horizontal, networked solution has proven much more effective in today's world. In his second edition, Robert Clark--former CIA analyst and executive in the Intelligence Directorate--explains how a collaborative, target-centric process both attends to the needs of the customer and promotes more effective collection. Based on feedback from users, early chapters introduce the concept of model synthesis more gradually. Recent intelligence events--with the Iraqi WMD Commission Report at center stage--illustrate the importance of target-centric analysis. This revision also includes broader treatment of collection strategies, systems analysis, and analyst-customer interaction as well as more attention to denial and deception, and to both counterterrorism and counterintelligence analysis. This new edition contains updates of the practical information and day-to-day details from the previous book told as only an experienced intelligence hand could. Extensive descriptions of the art of target modeling and organizational analysis, as well as thoroughly detailed overviews of the quantitative and predictive techniques used in intelligence analysis make this book an essential tool for illuminating an often shadowy world.

    Leading intelligence scholars Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt clearly explain such topics as the principles of collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action, and their interrelationship with policymakers and democratic values. This new edition takes account of the expanding literature in the field of intelligence and deals with the consequences for intelligence of vast recent changes in telecommunication and computer technology the new “information age.” It also reflects the world’s strategic changes since the end of the Cold War. This landmark book provides a valuable framework for understanding today’s headlines, as well as the many developments likely to come in the real world of the spy.

    Now Bamford describes the transformation of the NSA since 9/11, as the agency increasingly turns its high-tech ears on the American public.The Shadow Factory reconstructs how the NSA missed a chance to thwart the 9/11 hijackers and details how this mistake has led to a heightening of domestic surveillance. In disturbing detail, Bamford describes exactly how every American’s data is being mined and what is being done with it. Any reader who thinks America’s liberties are being protected by Congress will be shocked and appalled at what is revealed here.From the Trade Paperback edition.

    Intelligence rains in, but without an understanding of the nature of the intelligence, it accumulates in puddles of obscurity. The problems therefore seem to be how to obtain it, how to understand it, and how to sell it to one's bosses. This book deals with how to understand it. Three fundamental points are at the heart of this presentation about the cognitive challenges intelligence analysts face: The mind is poorly wired to deal effectively with both inherent uncertainty (the natural fog surrounding complex, indeterminate intelligence issues) and induced uncertainty (the man-made fog fabricated by denial and deception operations). Even increased awareness of cognitive and other unmotivated biases, such as the tendency to see information confirming an already-held judgement more vividly than one sees disconfirming information, does little by itself to help analysts deal effectively with uncertainty. critical thinking can substantially improve analysis on complex issues on which information is incomplete, ambiguous, and often deliberately distorted. Key examples of such intellectual devices include techniques for structuring information, challenging assumptions, and exploring alternative interpretations. This book was first issued by the CIA.

    Not simply revised, but completely re-written, the Second Edition of this classic text is a fresh reinterpretation of the theories and events surrounding the Cuban Missle Crisis, incorporating all new information from the Kennedy tapes and recently declassified Soviet files. Essence of Decision Second Edition, is a vivid look at decision-making under pressure and is the only single volume work that attempts to answer the enduring question: how should citizens understand the actions of their government?

    Now, in On Grand Strategy, Gaddis reflects on what he has learned. In chapters extending from the ancient world through World War II, Gaddis assesses grand strategic theory and practice in Herodotus, Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Octavian/Augustus, St. Augustine, Machiavelli, Elizabeth I, Philip II, the American Founding Fathers, Clausewitz, Tolstoy, Lincoln, Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Isaiah Berlin. On Grand Strategy applies the sharp insights and wit readers have come to expect from Gaddis to times, places, and people he's never written about before. For anyone interested in the art of leadership, On Grand Strategy is, in every way, a master class.

    We've seen North Korea's retaliatory hack of Sony Pictures, China's large-scale industrial espionage against American companies, Russia's 2016 propaganda campaign, and quite a lot more. The cyber war is upon us.As the former Assistant Attorney General and Chief of Staff to FBI Director Robert Mueller, John Carlin has spent 15 years on the frontlines of America's ongoing cyber war with its enemies. In this dramatic book, he tells the story of his years-long secret battle to keep America safe, and warns us of the perils that await us as we embrace the latest digital novelties -- smart appliances, artificial intelligence, self-driving cars -- with little regard for how our enemies might compromise them. The potential targets for our enemies are multiplying: our electrical grid, our companies, our information sources, our satellites. As each sector of the economy goes digital, a new vulnerability is exposed.The Internet of Broken Things makes the urgent case that we need to start innovating more responsibly. As a fleet of web-connected cars and pacemakers rolls off the assembly lines, the potential for danger is overwhelming. We must see and correct these flaws before our enemies exploit them.

    government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002.The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations--analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind--were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation.In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.

    In this book, he shares his methods in great detail. Each step of his process is explained throughout twenty-five chapters of specialized websites, software solutions, and creative search techniques. Over 250 resources are identified with narrative tutorials and screen captures. This book will serve as a reference guide for anyone that is responsible for the collection of online content. It is written in a hands-on style that encourages the reader to execute the tutorials as they go. The search techniques offered will inspire analysts to "think outside the box" when scouring the internet for personal information. Much of the content of this book has never been discussed in any publication. Always thinking like a hacker, the author has identified new ways to use various technologies for an unintended purpose. This book will greatly improve anyone's online investigative skills. Among other techniques, you will learn how to locate: Hidden Social Network Content Cell Phone Subscriber Information Deleted Websites & Posts Missing Facebook Profile Data Full Twitter Account Data Alias Social Network Profiles Free Investigative Software Useful Browser Extensions Alternative Search Engine Results Website Owner Information Photo GPS & Metadata Live Streaming Social Content Social Content by Location IP Addresses of Users Additional User Accounts Sensitive Documents & Photos Private Email Addresses Duplicate Video Posts Mobile App Network Data Unlisted Addresses s Public Government Records Document Metadata Rental Vehicle Contracts Online Criminal Activity Personal Radio Communications Compromised Email Information Automated Collection Solutions Linux Investigative Programs Dark Web Content (Tor) Restricted YouTube Content Hidden Website Details Vehicle Registration Details

    The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age takes the first part of its title from an earlier collection of essays, published by Princeton University Press in 1943, which became a classic of historical scholarship. Three essays are repinted from the earlier book; four others have been extensively revised. The rest--twenty-two essays--are new.The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations--the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of revolutionary war in the modern world. Still others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts--the First and Second World Wars--or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment. Together the contributors have produced a book that reinterprets and illuminates war, one of the most powerful forces in history and one that cannot be controlled in the future without an understanding of its past.

    The new edition, An Enduring Debate, continues the important discussion of nuclear proliferation and the dangers of a nuclear-armed world. With new chapters on the questions surrounding a nuclear North Korea, Iran, and Iraq and the potential for a world free of nuclear weapons, this Third Edition will continue to generate a lively classroom experience.