While the US was trying to quell extremists, a highly secretive and compartmentalized wing of I.S.I., known as "Directorate S," was covertly training, arming, and seeking to legitimize the Taliban, in order to enlarge Pakistan's sphere of influence. After 9/11, when fifty-nine countries, led by the U. S., deployed troops or provided aid to Afghanistan in an effort to flush out the Taliban and Al Qaeda, the U.S. was set on an invisible slow-motion collision course with Pakistan.Today we know that the war in Afghanistan would falter badly because of military hubris at the highest levels of the Pentagon, the drain on resources and provocation in the Muslim world caused by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and corruption. But more than anything, as Coll makes painfully clear, the war in Afghanistan was doomed because of the failure of the United States to apprehend the motivations and intentions of I.S.I.'s "Directorate S". This was a swirling and shadowy struggle of historic proportions, which endured over a decade and across both the Bush and Obama administrations, involving multiple secret intelligence agencies, a litany of incongruous strategies and tactics, and dozens of players, including some of the most prominent military and political figures. A sprawling American tragedy, the war was an open clash of arms but also a covert melee of ideas, secrets, and subterranean violence. Coll excavates this grand battle, which took place away from the gaze of the American public. With unsurpassed expertise, original research, and attention to detail, he brings to life a narrative at once vast and intricate, local and global, propulsive and painstaking. This is the definitive explanation of how America came to be so badly ensnared in an elaborate, factional, and seemingly interminable conflict in South Asia. Nothing less than a forensic examination of the personal and political forces that shape world history, Directorate S is a complete masterpiece of both investigative and narrative journalism.

    Gen. George S. PattonHere is a unique book that emphasizes the attainment of military excellence through reading and field experience. Written to help men and women prepare for positions of command in the American Armed Forces, it is a product of the author’s years of discussions with military commanders about their roles as decision-makers, moral standard bearers, and energizers of military organizations.In his commentary on the problems of the commander as tactician, strategist, warrior, trainer, mentor, disciplinarian, and moral leader, the author analyzes and recommends both classical and current readings that are available for those who seek an expanded vision of their potential as commanders. This book is designed to raise new challenges to conventional thinking about the art of military command.

    Making the most of unprecedented, direct access to his subjects, Anderson combines powerful, firsthand storytelling with balanced, penetrating analysis of each situation. A work of phenomenal range, analytical acuity, and human empathy, Guerrillas amply demonstrates why Jon Lee Anderson is one of our most important chroniclers of societies in crisis.

    Hostage-taking and other acts of violence for political ends are common all over the globe. This groundbreaking study sheds new light on the phenomenon of terrorism.This book examines and explains the nature and sources of terrorists' beliefs, actions, goals, worldviews, and states of mind. Origins of Terrorism addresses, with scholarly responsibility as well as necessary urgency, one of the most vexing intellectual and political challenges of our time.The contributors to this book bring deep learning and experience in realms that are vital to an understanding of the arenas within which terrorist behavior takes place-arenas such as ideology, nationalism and religion. The authors explore terrorist behavior in its troubling richness and diversity, and identify the ways in which it develops, grows and sustains itself. In addition, they study the mechanisms that enable terrorists to easily carry out violent acts against innocents, as well as the ways in which leaders of governments respond to terrorist actions and threats. Finally, they identify the opportunities for future research in the psychology of terrorism as well as the limits of such researchThis collection, under Reich's editorship, will help us to understand terrorism as well as the motivations behind it. Origins of Terrorism, which is being published simultaneously in hardcover and paperback, is an important study which is bound to affect the way we look at world politics.

    But we are pulled in the other direction too by the anxiety that a violent response to violence makes us morally indistinguishable from our enemies. There is perhaps no greater political challenge today than trying to win the war against terror without losing our democratic souls. Michael Ignatieff confronts this challenge head-on, with the combination of hard-headed idealism, historical sensitivity, and political judgment that has made him one of the most influential voices in international affairs today.Ignatieff argues that we must not shrink from the use of violence--that far from undermining liberal democracy, force can be necessary for its survival. But its use must be measured, not a program of torture and revenge. And we must not fool ourselves that whatever we do in the name of freedom and democracy is good. We may need to kill to fight the greater evil of terrorism, but we must never pretend that doing so is anything better than a lesser evil.In making this case, Ignatieff traces the modern history of terrorism and counter-terrorism, from the nihilists of Czarist Russia and the militias of Weimar Germany to the IRA and the unprecedented menace of Al Qaeda, with its suicidal agents bent on mass destruction. He shows how the most potent response to terror has been force, decisive and direct, but--just as important--restrained. The public scrutiny and political ethics that motivate restraint also give democracy its strongest weapon: the moral power to endure when the furies of vengeance and hatred are spent.The book is based on the Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 2003.

    (Unilateral Declaration of Independence) by the Smith government to the Lancaster House agreement that transferred power. There are vivid accounts of the operations against the "guerillas" by the security forces and the intensity of the fighting will surprise readers. Atrocities were undoubtedly committed by both sides but equally the protagonists were playing for very high stakes.This is more than just a book on military operations. It provides expert analysis of the historical situation and examines events up to the present day, including Mugabe's operations against rival tribes and white farmers. For a thorough work on its subject this book cannot be bettered. Essential reading for those wishing to learn more about a counter-insurgency campaign. The ingenuity of the Rhodesian military fighting against overwhelming odds and restricted by sanctions is impressive but the outcome culminating in the Lancaster House Agreement was inevitable.

    wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong.Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost — but we didn’t have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.

    Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war. Linda Robinson conducted extensive interviews with Petraeus and his subordinate commanders and spent weeks with key U.S. and Iraqi divisions. The result is the only book that ties together military operations in Iraq and the internecine political drama that is at the heart of the civil war. Replete with dramatic battles, behind-doors confrontations, and astute analysis, the book tells the full story of the Iraq War’s endgame, and lays out the options that will be facing the next president when he or she takes office in January 2009.

    They are spy satellites--the means by which the super-pwers keep tabs on each other in the deep black of space. Excellent . . . Highly recommended!--Booklist.

    It is a secretive and mysterious unit, whose operations and internal structures are hidden from the public eye. Now, one of its longest-serving veterans offers a glimpse into the shadowy world of the SAS. Rusty Firmin spent an incredible 15 years with 'The Regiment' and was a key figure in the assault of the Iranian Embassy in London in May 1980. Newly revised and available in paperback, this is the unforgettable chronicle of Rusty's combat experiences – a fascinating and intimate portrayal of what it was like to be part of the world's most respected Special Operations Force.

    a strong and stimulating book. It has no rival in either scope or quality. For libraries, history buffs, and armchair warriors, it is a must. For political science students, career diplomats, and officers in the armed services, its reading should be required." --History"A particularly timely account." --Kansas City Times"It reads easily but is not a popularized history... nor does the book become a history of battles.... Weigley's analyses and interpretations are searching, competent, and useful." --Perspective

    Through the analysis of international perceptions and power, it shows that South Vietnam was a vital interest of the United States. The book provides many new insights into the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 and demonstrates that the coup negated the South Vietnamese government's tremendous, and hitherto unappreciated, military and political gains between 1954 and 1963. After Diem's assassination, President Lyndon Johnson had at his disposal several aggressive policy options that could have enabled South Vietnam to continue the war without a massive US troop infusion, but he ruled out these options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence, making such an infusion the only means of saving the country.

    In this timely and controversial examination of civilian-military relations in wartime democracies, Eliot A. Cohen chips away at this time-honored belief with case studies of statesmen who dared to prod, provoke, and even defy their military officers to great effect.Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argument, Cohen offers compelling proof that, as Clemenceau put it, “War is too important to leave to the generals.” By examining the shared leadership traits of four politicians who triumphed in extraordinarily varied military campaigns, Cohen argues that active statesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subordinates to succeed where they might have failed if left to their own devices. Thought provoking and soundly argued, Cohen's Supreme Command is essential reading not only for military and political players but also for informed citizens and anyone interested in leadership.

    Clark recounts his experience leading NATO's forces to a hard-fought and ultimately successful victory in Kosovo in 1999. As the American military machine has swung into action in the months following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it has become clear that the lessons of Kosovo are directly applicable to the war against terrorism and the nations that sponsor it. The problems posed, and overcome, in the war in Kosovo-how to fight an air war against unconventional forces in rough terrain and how to coordinate U.S. objectives with those of other nations-are the problems that America increasingly faces in the today's world. As the Los Angeles Times noted in late September of 2001, this book's "lessons are highly relevant now…. We need to think about exactly what steps will lessen, rather than increase, the terrorist threat. And we also need innovative commanders willing to improvise to meet a new kind of threat, more determined political leadership, a more flexible outlook in the Pentagon…. Gen. Clark has performed another service by highlighting these problems at a crucial moment in American history."Waging Modern War is history, memoir, guidebook, and forecast, essential reading for those who want to know how modern war is fought, and won.

    The hit-and-run bloodletting across the war's decade tallied more than 25,000 dead Soviet soldiers plus a great many more casualties and further demoralized a USSR on the verge of disintegration.In The Soviet-Afghan War the Russian general staff takes a close critical look at the Soviet military's disappointing performance in that war in an effort to better understand what happened and why and what lessons should be taken from it. Lester Grau and Michael Gress's expert English translation of the general staff's study offers the very first publication in any language of this important and illuminating work.Surprisingly, this was a study the general staff never intended to write, initially viewing the war in Afghanistan as a dismal aberration in Russian military history. The history of the 1990s has, of course, completely demolished that belief, as evidenced by the Russian Army's subsequent engagements with guerrilla forces in Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and elsewhere. As a result, Russian officers decided to take a much closer look at the Red Army's experiences in the Afghan War.Their study presents the Russian view of how the war started, how it progressed, and how it ended; shows how a modern mechanized army organized and conducted a counter-guerrilla war; chronicles the major battles and operations; and provides valuable insights into Soviet tactics, strategy, doctrine, and organization across a wide array of military branches. The editors' incisive preface and commentary help contextualize the Russian view and alert the reader to blind spots in the general staff's thinking about the war.This one-of-a-kind document provides a powerful case study on how yet another modern mechanized army imprudently relied upon the false promise of technology to defeat a determined guerrilla foe. Along the way, it vividly reveals the increasing disillusionment of Soviet soldiers, how that disillusion seeped back into Soviet society, and how it contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Red Army had fought their war to a military draw but that was not enough to stave off political defeat at home. The Soviet-Afghan War helps clarify how such a surprising demise could have materialized in the backyard of the Cold War's other great superpower.