Brushing stereotypes aside, the author takes a fresh look at what these strategic thinkers actually said--not what they are widely believed to have said. He finds that despite their apparent differences in terms of time, place, cultural background, and level of material/technological development, all had much more in common than previously supposed. In fact, the central conclusion of this book is that the logic of waging war and of strategic thinking is as universal and timeless as human nature itself.This third, revised and expanded edition includes five new chapters and some new charts and diagrams.

    Seventeen case studies analyze through a common framework how strategies have sought to implement a coherent course of action against their adversaries. 24 line drawings. 31 tables.

    . . . Quite simply the best single volume currently available on this topic.”—Tim Rutten, Los Angeles Times After September 11, Americans agonized over why nineteen men hated the United States enough to kill three thousand civilians in an unprovoked assault. Analysts have offered a wide variety of explanations for the attack, but the one voice missing is that of the terrorists themselves. This penetrating book is the first to present the inner logic of al-Qa’ida and like-minded extremist groups by which they justify September 11 and other terrorist attacks.Mary Habeck explains that these extremist groups belong to a new movement—known as jihadism—with a specific ideology based on the thought of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Hasan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb. Jihadist ideology contains new definitions of the unity of God and of jihad, which allow members to call for the destruction of democracy and the United States and to murder innocent men, women, and children. Habeck also suggests how the United States might defeat the jihadis, using their own ideology against them.

    Much of the blame has been attributed to poor strategy. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, public enquiries and defence think tanks have detected a lack of consistent direction, of effective communication, and of governmental coordination. In this important book, Sir Hew Strachan, one of the world's leading military historians, reveals how these failures resulted from a fundamental misreading and misapplication of strategy itself. He argues that the wars since 2001 have not in reality been as 'new' as has been widely assumed and that we need to adopt a more historical approach to contemporary strategy in order to identify what is really changing in how we wage war. If war is to fulfil the aims of policy, then we need first to understand war.

    a strong and stimulating book. It has no rival in either scope or quality. For libraries, history buffs, and armchair warriors, it is a must. For political science students, career diplomats, and officers in the armed services, its reading should be required." --History"A particularly timely account." --Kansas City Times"It reads easily but is not a popularized history... nor does the book become a history of battles.... Weigley's analyses and interpretations are searching, competent, and useful." --Perspective

    He explores the army's forgotten heritage of deterrence, it's long experience with counter-guerrilla operations, and it's successive efforts to transform itself.

    Even today, it is highly regarded as a seminal work in the development of strategy.Antoine Henri de Jomini was one of Napoleon's most capable generals. He contributed to almost all of Napoleon's major battles. Napoleon regarded him so highly he made him Baron De Jomini. At the close of the Napoleonic wars De Jomini became General and Aide de camp for the Tsar of Russia. His first-hand accounts and rigorous analysis of important battles is still a major resource on tactics, strategy and warfare.Other Special Editions in this series that deal with the subject of warfare and strategy include: The Art of War by Sun Tzu - Special Edition The Art of War By Mao Tse-tung - Special Edition The Art of War & The Prince By Machiavelli - Special Edition

    It suggests that two very different phenomena have been at work over the past centuries: military revolutions, which are driven by vast social and political changes, and revolutions in military affairs, which military institutions have directed, although usually with great difficulty and ambiguous results. MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray provide a conceptual framework and historical context for understanding the patterns of change, innovation, and adaptation that have marked war in the Western world since the fourteenth century--beginning with Edward III's revolution in medieval warfare, through the development of modern military institutions in seventeenth-century France, to the military impact of mass politics in the French Revolution, the cataclysmic military-industrial struggle of 1914-1918, and the German Blitzkrieg victories of 1940. Case studies and a conceptual overview offer an indispensible introduction to revolutionary military change, --which is as inevitable as it is difficult to predict. Macgregor Knox is the Stevenson Professor of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of Common Destiny (Cambridge, 2000) and Hitler's Italian Allies (Cambridge, 2000). Knox and Murray are co-editors of Making of Strategy (Cambridge, 1996). Willamson Murray is Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defense Analysis. He is the co-editor of Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, 1996) and author of A War to Be Won (Harvard University Press, 2000)

    Puryear follows MacArthur, Marshall, Eisenhower and Patton through the years of their military service in both peace and war.

    Writings of Sun Tzu, Vegetius, Marshal Maurice de Saxe, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon.

    Journalist-historian S. L. A. Marshall wrote the first at the behest of Gen. George C. Marshall, who formed the great citizen army of World War II. The general believed officers of all services needed to base their professional commitment on a common moral-ethical grounding, which S. L. A. Marshall set out to explain. Ever since, these books have provided a foundation of thought, conduct, standards, and duty for American commissioned officers.Available now to the general public, this new edition takes the series’ inspirational premise into the new century. It educates officers of all services, as well as civilians, about the fundamental moral-ethical requirements of being a commissioned officer in the armed forces of the United States. Understanding the common foundation of commissioned leadership and command of U.S. military forces is essential for achieving excellence in the joint operations of today’s combat environment. This philosophy unites the officers of the uniformed services in the common calling of supporting, defending, and upholding the Constitution in service to their country.

    Gen. George S. PattonHere is a unique book that emphasizes the attainment of military excellence through reading and field experience. Written to help men and women prepare for positions of command in the American Armed Forces, it is a product of the author’s years of discussions with military commanders about their roles as decision-makers, moral standard bearers, and energizers of military organizations.In his commentary on the problems of the commander as tactician, strategist, warrior, trainer, mentor, disciplinarian, and moral leader, the author analyzes and recommends both classical and current readings that are available for those who seek an expanded vision of their potential as commanders. This book is designed to raise new challenges to conventional thinking about the art of military command.

    In this probing analysis of U.S. military policy in Vietnam, career army officer and strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., argues that precisely because of this mindset the war was lost before it was fought.The army assumed that it could transplant to Indochina the operational methods that had been successful in the European battle theaters of World War II, an approach that proved ill-suited to the way the Vietnamese Communist forces fought. Theirs was a war of insurgency, and counterinsurgency, Krepinevich contends, requires light infantry formations, firepower restraint, and the resolution of political and social problems within the nation. To the very end, top military commanders refused to recognize this.Krepinevich documents the deep division not only between the American military and civilian leaders over the very nature of the war, but also within the U.S. Army itself. Through extensive research in declassified material and interviews with officers and men with battlefield experience, he shows that those engaged in the combat understood early on that they were involved in a different kind of conflict. Their reports and urgings were discounted by the generals, who pressed on with a conventional war that brought devastation but little success.A thorough analysis of the U.S. Army’s role in the Vietnam War, this book demonstrates with chilling persuasiveness the ways in which the army was unprepared to fight—lessons applicable to today’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

    But this is to overlook force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which materiel is actually used. In a landmark reconception of battle and war, this book provides a systematic account of how force employment interacts with materiel to produce real combat outcomes. Stephen Biddle argues that force employment is central to modern war, becoming increasingly important since 1900 as the key to surviving ever more lethal weaponry. Technological change produces opposite effects depending on how forces are employed; to focus only on materiel is thus to risk major error--with serious consequences for both policy and scholarship.In clear, fluent prose, Biddle provides a systematic account of force employment's role and shows how this account holds up under rigorous, multimethod testing. The results challenge a wide variety of standard views, from current expectations for a revolution in military affairs to mainstream scholarship in international relations and orthodox interpretations of modern military history. Military Power will have a resounding impact on both scholarship in the field and on policy debates over the future of warfare, the size of the military, and the makeup of the defense budget.

    Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, military analysts, and members of the public look to the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s for lessons to apply to the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a new foreword by John A. Nagl, author of Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Praeger, 2002).