Corbett placed naval warfare within the larger framework of human conflict, proposing that the key to maritime dominance lies in effective use of sea lines for communications and in denying that use to the enemy. His concept — which regarded naval strategy not as an end in itself but as a means to an end, with that end defined by national strategy — makes this a work of enduring value.Principles of Maritime Strategy emphasizes precise definitions of terminology and ideas as the antidote to loose and purposeless discussion and the direct path to the fundamental data on which all are agreed. As Corbett notes in the Introduction, "In this way we prepare the apparatus of practical discussion; we secure the means of arranging the factors in manageable shape, and of deducing from them with precision and rapidity a practical course of action. Without such apparatus no two men can even think on the same line; much less can they ever hope to detach the real point of difference that divides them and isolate it for quiet solution."Much quoted and referenced, this ever-relevant work is an indispensable resource for military professionals, historians, and students.

    It was a bitter pill. After working on their own in Vietnam for more than two years, the Brigade LRRPs were ordered to join forces with the division once again.But even as these formidable hunters and killers were themselves swallowed up by the Screaming Eagles' Division LRPs to eventually become F Co., 58th Infantry, they continued the deadly, daring LRRP tradition. From saturation patrols along the Laotian border to near-suicide missions and compromised positions in the always dangerous A Shau valley, the F/58th unflinchingly faced death every day and became one of the most highly decorated companies in the history of the 101st.

    The challenges were huge; the lack of preparation time; the urgency; the huge distances involved; the need to requisition ships from trade to name but four.After a brief discussion of events leading to Argentina s invasion the book describes in detail the rush to reorganize and deploy forces, dispatch a large task force, the innovative solutions needed to sustain the Task Force, the vital staging base at Ascension Island, the in-theater resupply, the setbacks and finally the restoring of order after victory.Had the logistics plan failed, victory would have been impossible and humiliation inevitable, with no food for the troops, no ammunition for the guns, no medical support for casualties etc.The lessons learnt have never been more important with increasing numbers of out-of-area operations required in remote trouble spots at short notice. The Falklands experience is crucial for the education of new generations of military planners and fascinating for military buffs and this book fills an important gap.REVIEWS With inadequate training, little intelligence, no contingency plan, a politically driven rush and at 8,000 miles, it is not surprising that logistics during Op CORPORATE were confusing and challenging. It has taken a US Army general to explain why. We should all be grateful. Michael Clapp, Commander Amphibious Task Forcea very accurate report about the course of The Conflict, like the British call it. The book gives a good insight in the decision process, at the Argentinian as well as at the British side, which lead to the armed battle of these islands. What interested me most is how the British came to it to decide, almost overnight, to begin a war and also, within 48 hours (promised by the British Navy) actually sailed out... a broad, interesting and subtle picture of the events that took placeAviation Book Reviews"highlights the importance of the integration of combat operations and logistics ..... argues convincingly that logistics was the center of gravity of the campaign... thorough research, including interviews leads to a comprehensive description of the combat operations and movement of supplies and equipment from the amphibious landing zone on the west shore of East Falkland on D-Day 21 May 1982, to the surrender on 14 June 1982... Privatsky's insights could also be applied to humanitarian affairs operations, especially if a natural disaster has destroyed piers or off loading equipment, or occurred in a remote location without pre positioned stores. Military operational planners and military history enthusiasts should add this book to their professional library Naval War College Review Spring 2016

    He had a small army--seldom exceeding 40,000 men--but a constellation of bold, revolutionary ideas about the conduct of war and the nature of government. J. F. C. Fuller, one of the foremost military historians of the twentieth-century, was the first to analyze Alexander in terms of his leadership as a general. He has divided his study into two parts. The first, entitled "The Record," describes the background of the era, Alexander's character and training, the structure of the Macedonian army, and the geography of the world that determined the strategy of conquest. The second part, "The Analysis," takes apart the great battles, from Granicus to Hydaspes, and concludes with two chapters on Alexander's statesmanship. In a style both clear and witty, Fuller imparts the many sides to Alexander's genius and the full extent of his empire, which stretched from India to Egypt.

    Writings of Sun Tzu, Vegetius, Marshal Maurice de Saxe, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon.

    Joel Struthers recounts the dangers and demands of military life, from the rigours of recruitment and operational training in the rugged mountains of France, to face-to-face combat in the grasslands of some of Africa’s most troubled nations.Told through the eyes of a soldier, and interspersed with humorous anecdotes, Appel is a fascinating story that debunks myths about the French Foreign Legion and shows it more accurately as a professional arm of the French military. Struthers provides insight into the rigorous discipline that the Legion instills in its young recruits, – who trade their identities as individuals for a life of adventure and a role in a unified fighting force whose motto is “Honour and Loyalty. ”Foreword by Col. Benoit Desmeulles, former commanding officer of the Legions 2e Régiment Étranger Parachutistes.

    He is the “grey eminence” within the Army whose influence helped to shape the careers of George Patton, George Marshall, and, most notably, President Eisenhower. What little is known about Conner comes primarily through stories about his relationship with Eisenhower, but little is known about Fox Conner himself.After a career that spanned four decades, this master strategist ordered all of his papers and journals burned. Because of this, most of what is known about Conner is oblique, as a passing reference in the memoirs of other great men. This book combines existing scholarship with long-forgotten references and unpublished original sources to achieve a more comprehensive picture of this dedicated public servant. The portrait that emerges provides a four-step model for developing strategic leaders that still holds true today. First and foremost, Conner was a master of his craft. Secondly, he recognized and recruited talented subordinates. Then he encouraged and challenged these protégés to develop their strengths and overcome their weaknesses. Finally he wasn’t afraid to break the rules of the organization to do it. Here, for the first time ever, is the story of Major General Fox Conner.

    But in the approximately 2,327 years that separated Man’s two most famous works of military tactics and strategy, a considerable number of less well-known works were published. Some, such as those written by Vauban and Douhet, were focused on specific aspects of war, while others like Onasander and Jomini wrote works that were more general in nature. But all of them were written with the objective of permitting generals and other leaders of men to wage war more effectively. There are few better suited to write the history of strategy and military thought than Dr. Martin van Creveld, who has himself been a significant contributor to the literature of war. A Professor Emeritus at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Dr. van Creveld is one of the world’s leading writers on military history and strategy, with a special interest in the future of war. He is fluent in Hebrew, German, Dutch, and English, and has authored more than twenty books, including the influential Technology and War: 2000 BC to the Present (1988), The Transformation of War (1991), and The Culture of War (2010). He is known for his development of the concept of “nontrinitarian” warfare as well as contributing two books to the 4GW canon. Featuring a foreword by Dr. Jerrry Pournelle, A History of Strategy: From Sun Tzu to William S. Lind begins with the Chinese military literature, then reviews the Greek, Roman and Byzantine works before proceeding to the Middle Ages. From Machiavelli and Montecuccoli to Guibert and Frederick the Great, van Creveld chronicles the gradual transition from medieval to Napoleonic warfare. Subsequent chapters delve into the literature of naval warfare, including Mahan and Corbett, then examine the works of the leading strategists of the early 20th century, including Moltke, Liddell Hart, and Ludendorff. The final chapter considers the modern strategists behind such concepts as Mutually Assured Destruction, terrorism, insurgency, and 4th Generation War. This brief, but wide-ranging history is an effective education in military thought. It is an excellent introduction to the various strategic works for the neophyte, and an illuminating summary of them for armchair and professional experts alike. Van Creveld not only describes each thinker and his most important contributions, but explains how one conceptual advancement led to another, and in doing so, makes it eminently clear why Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are so universally well-regarded by theoreticians and practitioners of war alike.

    It was the right sentiment, perhaps, in an age of imperial rivalry but today many Americans doubt the utility of their global military presence, thinking it outdated, unnecessary or even dangerous.In The Big Stick, Eliot A. Cohen-a scholar and practitioner of international relations-disagrees. He argues that hard power remains essential for American foreign policy. While acknowledging that the US must be careful about why, when, and how it uses force, he insists that its international role is as critical as ever, and armed force is vital to that role.Cohen explains that American leaders must learn to use hard power in new ways and for new circumstances. The rise of a well-armed China, Russia's conquest of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran, and the spread of radical Islamist movements like ISIS are some of the key threats to global peace. If the United States relinquishes its position as a strong but prudent military power, and fails to accept its role as the guardian of a stable world order we run the risk of unleashing disorder, violence and tyranny on a scale not seen since the 1930s. The US is still, as Madeleine Albright once dubbed it, "the indispensable nation."

    However, their recent performance in Iraq and Afghanistan is widely seen as—at best—disappointing; under British control Basra degenerated into a lawless city riven with internecine violence, while tactical mistakes and strategic incompetence in Helmand Province resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a climate of violence and insecurity. In both cases the British were eventually and humiliatingly bailed out by the US army.In this thoughtful and compellingly readable book, Frank Ledwidge examines the British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, asking how and why it went so wrong. With the aid of copious research, interviews with senior officers, and his own personal experiences, he looks in detail at the failures of strategic thinking and culture that led to defeat in Britain's latest "small wars." This is an eye-opening analysis of the causes of military failure, and its enormous costs.

    You may find it for free on the web. Purchase of the Kindle edition includes wireless delivery.

    Young Thomas witnessed the atrocities that the Nazis had carried out in Spain and trained his pilots to show no mercy when towards the end of the book, he breached the rules to attack German planes. Published by The Electronic Book Company

    A short book detailing: The most terrifying missions: The first mission to Balikpapan, an important Japanese fuel depot, and why it was considered impossible to achieve. Coping with boredom and fear: How joking and calculating survival odds helped deal with the realities. The snafus: The time a temporary Group Commander tried to bomb the US Seventh Fleet. True stories from a man who was there--as dictated toward the end of his life.

    You may find it for free on the web. Purchase of the Kindle edition includes wireless delivery.

    It is the true story of what the war was like in Bosnia and in Kosovo.Combined with the stories are his 'observations' about the military tactics that were applied in these conflicts. They provide practical advice for soldiers and civilians on how to survive in a war zone.