What Alexis de Tocquevillecalled the “township”—that unique locus of the power ofcitizens—has been replaced. But with what? In a work thatcombines rich history and keen sociological observation,Marc Dunkelman identifies an epochal shift in the structureof American life. Routines that once put doctors and lawyersin touch with grocers and plumbers have withered as technologyallows us to connect exclusively with a more selectgroup. The rhythms that compelled us to understand thepeople living across town have disappeared. In their placeare new patterns that confound our ability to compromise inpolitics, innovate within the private sector, and care properlyfor the most vulnerable. But the American Age has not yetended, and The Vanishing Neighbor argues that to win thefuture we need to adapt yesterday’s institutions to the realitiesof the twenty-first-century American community.

    The crisis seemed to expose the disaster of small-state, free-market liberalization and deregulation. Keynesian political economy, in contrast, could put the state back at the heart of the economy and arm it with the knowledge needed to rescue us. But what it was supposed to rescue us from was not so clear. Was it the end of capitalism or the end of the world? For Keynesianism, the answer is both. Keynesians are not and never have been out to save capitalism, but rather to save civilization from itself. It is political economy, they promise, for the world in which we actually live: a world in which prices are “sticky,” information is “asymmetrical,” and uncertainty inescapable. In this world, things will definitely not take care of themselves in the long run. Poverty is ineradicable, markets fail, and revolutions lead to tyranny. Keynesianism is thus modern liberalism’s most persuasive internal critique, meeting two centuries of crisis with a proposal for capital without capitalism and revolution without revolutionaries.If our current crises have renewed Keynesianism for so many, it is less because the present is worth saving, than because the future seems out of control. In that situation, Keynesianism is a perfect fit: a faith for the faithless.

    But in A Significant Life, philosopher Todd May offers an exhilarating new way of thinking about these questions, one deeply attuned to life as it actually is: a work in progress, a journey—and often a narrative. Offering moving accounts of his own life and memories alongside rich engagements with philosophers from Aristotle to Heidegger, he shows us where to find the significance of our lives: in the way we live them.  May starts by looking at the fundamental fact that life unfolds over time, and as it does so, it begins to develop certain qualities, certain themes. Our lives can be marked by intensity, curiosity, perseverance, or many other qualities that become guiding narrative values. These values lend meanings to our lives that are distinct from—but also interact with—the universal values we are taught to cultivate, such as goodness or happiness. Offering a fascinating examination of a broad range of figures—from music icon Jimi Hendrix to civil rights leader Fannie Lou Hamer, from cyclist Lance Armstrong to The Portrait of a Lady’s Ralph Touchett to Claus von Stauffenberg, a German officer who tried to assassinate Hitler—May shows that narrative values offer a rich variety of criteria by which to assess a life, specific to each of us and yet widely available. They offer us a way of reading ourselves, who we are, and who we might like to be.   Clearly and eloquently written, A Significant Life is a recognition and a comfort, a celebration of the deeply human narrative impulse by which we make—even if we don’t realize it—meaning for ourselves. It offers a refreshing way to think of an age-old question, of quite simply, what makes a life worth living.

    But when utopian programs clash with dissenters—and with reality itself—the result is chaos, which revolutionaries seek to quash with repression and terror. In Sexual Utopia in Power, F. Roger Devlin explores today’s sexual dystopia, with its loose morals and confused sexual roles; its soaring rates of divorce, celibacy, and childlessness; and the increasingly arbitrary and punitive attempts to regulate and police it. Devlin shows that the breakdown of monogamy results in promiscuity for the few, loneliness for the majority, and unhappiness for all. Every revolution gives rise to a reaction. Devlin, however, is very critical of mainstream conservative responses to the sexual revolution, which often eerily echo feminist complaints about innocent women being preyed upon by wicked men who must be scolded and punished. The most controversial aspect of Devlin’s work is his argument that today’s sexual dystopia is rooted just as much in women’s nature as men’s, exploring such taboo topics as female hypergamy (mating up), narcissism, infidelity, deceptiveness, and masochism. By showing their biological basis, F. Roger Devlin offers a non-traditional defense of traditional sexual morals and institutions and shows us the way out of today’s sexual dystopia. Contents Preface Introduction: The Facts of Life 1. Sexual Utopia in Power 2. Rotating Polyandry—& its Enforcers 3. The Female Sexual Counter-Revolution and its Limitations 4. Home Economics 5. The Family Way 6. Back to Africa: Sexual Atavism in the Modern West 7. The Question of Female Masochism Index (Print edition only) Praise for F. Roger Devlin “‘Sexual Utopia in Power,’ Devlin’s infamous essay that launched a thousand blog posts about female hypergamy, is highly quotable and insightful in its analysis of the contemporary struggle between the sexes. Its indictments of feminism and warnings to men have only become more relevant since it was written. ‘Sexual Utopia’ is also an important response to clueless conservatives who rush to blame men for not marrying and starting families with women who are in many (though not all) cases simply unmarriageable.”— Jack Donovan, author of The Way of Men “. . . outstanding (and MSM blacked out) essays on gender dynamics . . .”—Roissy/Heartiste “If Roissy has anything resembling a mentor, it is F. Roger Devlin.”— Charlotte Allen, The Weekly Standard “Love and sex have never been confusing to me. I have Roger Devlin to thank for that.”—Chloë Thurlow, best-selling author of The Secret Life of Girls “Dr. Devlin is perhaps best role model there is for independent scholars on the right. His writings can be found on nearly every website the mainstream fears.”— Benjamin Villaroel, American Renaissance “In a decent world, Devlin would be an instantly-recognizable name and a literary giant.”— Spirit/Water/Blood “I have admired F. Roger Devlin’s path-breaking writings in The Occidental Quarterly since I became aware of them, and I’ve emphatically recommended them to everyone within reach. Dr. Devlin is a writer — percipient, witty, and courageous — who simply must be read.”— Nicholas Strakon, The Last Ditch “I believe the author is evil.”— Tyler Cowan F. Roger Devlin, Ph.D.

    His sweeping, startling narrative takes us behind the scenes to see how the tools and techniques of image making and message craft work. We meet Woodrow Wilson convening the first White House press conference, Franklin Roosevelt huddling with his private pollsters, Ronald Reagan’s aides crafting his nightly news sound bites, and George W. Bush staging his “Mission Accomplished” photo-op. We meet, too, the backstage visionaries who pioneered new ways of gauging public opinion and mastering the media—figures like George Cortelyou, TR’s brilliantly efficient press manager; 1920s ad whiz Bruce Barton; Robert Montgomery, Dwight Eisenhower’s canny TV coach; and of course the key spinmeisters of our own times, from Roger Ailes to David Axelrod.Greenberg also examines the profound debates Americans have waged over the effect of spin on our politics. Does spin help our leaders manipulate the citizenry? Or does it allow them to engage us more fully in the democratic project? Exploring the ideas of the century’s most incisive political critics, from Walter Lippmann and H. L. Mencken to Hannah Arendt and Stephen Colbert, Republic of Spin illuminates both the power of spin and its limitations—its capacity not only to mislead but also to lead.

    But most residents of Denmark and Sweden, he found, don't worship any god at all, don't pray, and don't give much credence to religious dogma of any kind. Instead of being bastions of sin and corruption, however, as the Christian Right has suggested a godless society would be, these countries are filled with residents who score at the very top of the "happiness index" and enjoy their healthy societies, which boast some of the lowest rates of violent crime in the world (along with some of the lowest levels of corruption), excellent educational systems, strong economies, well-supported arts, free health care, egalitarian social policies, outstanding bike paths, and great beer.Zuckerman formally interviewed nearly 150 Danes and Swedes of all ages and educational backgrounds over the course of fourteen months. He was particularly interested in the worldviews of people who live their lives without religious orientation. How do they think about and cope with death? Are they worried about an afterlife? What he found is that nearly all of his interviewees live their lives without much fear of the Grim Reaper or worries about the hereafter. This led him to wonder how and why it is that certain societies are non-religious in a world that seems to be marked by increasing religiosity. Drawing on prominent sociological theories and his own extensive research, Zuckerman ventures some interesting answers.This fascinating approach directly counters the claims of outspoken, conservative American Christians who argue that a society without God would be hell on earth. It is crucial, Zuckerman believes, for Americans to know that "society without God is not only possible, but it can be quite civil and pleasant."

     Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposing viewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism, and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher's explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other's arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series

    Religion and philosophy, not economics or politics, determine history and society. Berdyaev takes up the story in the nineteenth century. He traces the lineage of such powerful artists and thinkers as Chaadev, Khomyakov, Kireevksy, Leontyev, Aksakov, Hertzen, Bakunin, all of whom struggled to integrate the polarities of East and West, spirit and matter, and male and female in the Russian soul. This soul, however, is so immense, boundless, and vague that it is incapable of settling for "the halfway kingdom of culture." Demanding all or nothing, alternatively apocalyptic and nihilistic, Russians strove to justify culture and discover Russia's mystical mission. Impatient with the slow processes of history, distrusting all authority and yet haunted by a vision of unity, thinkers such as Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, Federov, and Solovyov created an original and vital religious philosophy that culminated in the Russian Renaissance at the beginning of the twentieth century. The fruit of these great figures, of whom Berdyaev was one (others included Florensky, Bulgakov, Rozanov, Merezhkovsky, Blok, and Bely), was cut short by the 1917 Revolution. In recent years, however, their works have been available in self-published (Samizdat) editions. Underground, a great philosophical and spiritual rebirth was occuring. Now they are available again, and the next installment of the Russian idea is being prepared. This book is therefore essential reading for an understanding of the new Russia.

    An evolution of libertarianism, Agorism embraces all non-coercive human action and opposes all force- or fraud-based attempts to stifle innovation, trade, thought, and wealth. If you have ever suspected that government, academia, and other entities are trying to pull the wool over your eyes in order to control your money, your morality, and your life, you'll find answers and remedies in AN AGORIST PRIMER. In one concise volume, Samuel Edward Konkin III explains the theory, principles, and -- most important of all -- the practice of Agorism. If you think that consistency between means and ends matters, this is the book for you! From the preface: "Agorism is a way of thinking about the world around you, a method of understanding why things work the way they do, how they do, and how they can be dealt with - how you can deal with them. "Agorism was meant to improve the lot of everyone, not a chosen elite or unwashed underclass. Hence an introductory work that presents ideas without going through the long intellectual history and conflict of competing ideas that produced them. "As the creator of agorism, it is most incumbent on me first to attempt to reduce it to basic intelligibility." Samuel Edward Konkin III is the author of the seminal work on libertarianism and Agorism, New Libertarian Manifesto. Over the course of thirty years, he wrote, edited, and published newsletters and magazines such as Laissez Faire, New Libertarian Notes, and 101 issues of the longest-running publication of its kind, New Libertarian Weekly. Known to his friends as SEK3, Mr. Konkin graduated cum laude from the University of Alberta, serving as head of the Young Social Credit League there. He received his Masters in Theoretical Chemistry at New York University, but left NYU without submitting his Ph.D. dissertation in Quantum Mechanics to pursue his lifelong efforts to promote Counter-Economics and Agorism. He founded the New Libertarian Alliance, the Movement of the Libertarian Left and the outreach organization The Agorist Institute. His body of work is available from KoPubCo. PRAISE FOR SAMUEL EDWARD KONKIN III "Konkin's writings are to be welcomed. Because we need a lot more polycentrism in the movement. Because he shakes up Partyarchs who tend to fall into unthinking complacency. And especially because he cares deeply about liberty and can read and write, qualities which seem to be going out of style in the libertarian movement." --Murray N. Rothbard, Ph.D.

    It has been identified with totalitarianism, state terror, fanaticism, orchestrated violence, and blind obedience, and was directly associated with the horrors of the Second World War, which left more than 40 million dead and introduced inconceivable notions of inhumanity. The mere mention of the term today evokes visions of atrocities and ineffable cruelty. Yet, the end of the twentieth century appears to have spawned a renewed interest in fascism, suggesting that it is time for us to examine our understanding of its ideas, ideals, and inequities. Edited by Roger Griffin, described as 'the premier theorist {of fascism} of the younger generation' (Contemporary European History), this important Oxford Reader demonstrates why fascism strongly appeals to many people, and how dangerous the result of this fascination may be. It includes a wide selection of texts written by fascist thinkers and propagandists, as well as by prominent anti-fascists from both inside and outside Europe, before and after the Second World War. Included are texts on fascism in Germany and Italy, on the abortive pre-1945 fascisms in more than a dozen countries around the world, on reactions to fascism, and on post-war and contemporary fascism. With contributions from writers as diverse as Benito Mussolini and Primo Levi, Joseph Goebbels and George Orwell, Martin Heidegger and Max Horkheimer, this compelling anthology provides insight into the depths and breadths of the destructive repercussions of fascist ideology. In no other volume will students of political theory, history, sociology, and psychology have access to such a compendium of key texts on this simultaneoulsy intriguing and frightening political force.

    But William Cavanaugh argues that religious fervor never left -- it has only migrated toward a new object of worship. In Migrations of the Holy he examines the disconcerting modern transfer of sacred devotion from the church to the nation-state. In these chapters Cavanaugh cautions readers to be wary of a rigid separation of religion and politics that boxes in the church and sends citizens instead to the state for hope, comfort, and salvation as they navigate the risks and pains of mortal life. When nationality becomes the primary source of identity and belonging, he warns, the state becomes the god and idol of its own religion, the language of nationalism becomes a liturgy, and devotees willingly sacrifice their lives to serve and defend their country. Cavanaugh urges Christians to resist this form of idolatry, to unthink the inevitability of the nation-state and its dreary party politics, to embrace radical forms of political pluralism that privilege local communities -- and to cling to an incarnational theology that weaves itself seamlessly and tangibly into all aspects of daily life and culture. Read more about the book in a blog post by Cavanaugh on EerdWord.

    Left-wingers keenly support the bombing of Belgrade and the invasion of Iraq. Tories warn against the threat to civil liberties. The 'progressive' BBC gives a fair hearing to the Conservative Party. Socialist journalists turn and rend Ken Livingstone. In democratic London, merely expressing your opinion can be seriously bad for your career, while in autocratic Moscow you can say pretty much what you like, provided you don't do anything about it. The tearing down of the old Iron Curtain may have allowed markets to sweep into the old Warsaw Pact lands - but it has also permitted revolutionary left-wing ideas to spread like a bacillus through the 'West'.Nobody really cares any more about the old shibboleths of state ownership. The British Labour Party - which opposed nuclear weapons, supposedly on principle, when they mattered - is quite happy to spend billions on the same weapons now that they are unnecessary.The supposed 'right' is as confused and nonsensical as the supposed 'left'. Neo-conservatives run vast budget deficits at home and engage in utopian adventures abroad. They are actively opposed to old conservative ideas such as national sovereignty, strong families and rigorous selective education, and happy to bend the knee to left-wing orthodoxies from man-made global warming to egalitarianism.The political compass is broken, its needle swinging wildly and meaninglessly. The existing political parties have converged, or perhaps simply retreated in confusion on to what looked like safe territory, the often tried and repeated failed policies of Fabian Social Democracy, now worsened by 1960s sexual and social radicalism. They are no longer adversaries, their personnel are interchangeable and they struggle to find ways to distinguish themselves from each other. They simply ignore - or deny - huge areas of human experience and concern from mass immigration to the collapse of marriage and the disappearance of order and rigour in the state education system.Yet conventional wisdom continues to insist that formal politics can and should continue as it did before - and that an exasperated and increasingly angry electorate should place its hopes in a mere change of personnel at the next election. Peter Hitchens argues for the re-establishment of proper adversary politics and the rediscovery of principle.

    

    A New York Times Notable Book of 2017For most of Western history, Sitaraman argues, constitutional thinkers assumed economic inequality was inevitable and inescapable--and they designed governments to prevent class divisions from spilling over into class warfare. The American Constitution is different. Compared to Europe and the ancient world, America was a society of almost unprecedented economic equality, and the founding generation saw this equality as essential for the preservation of America's republic. Over the next two centuries, generations of Americans fought to sustain the economic preconditions for our constitutional system. But today, with economic and political inequality on the rise, Sitaraman says Americans face a choice: Will we accept rising economic inequality and risk oligarchy or will we rebuild the middle class and reclaim our republic?The Crisis of the Middle-Class Constitution is a tour de force of history, philosophy, law, and politics. It makes a compelling case that inequality is more than just a moral or economic problem; it threatens the very core of our constitutional system.

    In this book, a leading moral philosopher presents a comparison of humans to other animals and explores the impact of these virtues.