Napoleon disavowed any suggestion that he worked from formula ("Je n'ai jamais eu un plan d'opérations"), but military historian David Chandler demonstrates this was at best only a half-truth. To be sure, every operation Napoleon conducted contained unique improvisatory features. But there were from the first to the last certain basic principles of strategic maneuver and battlefield planning that he almost invariably put into practice. To clarify these underlying methods, as well as the style of Napoleon's fabulous intellect, Mr. Chandler examines in detail each campaign mounted and personally conducted by Napoleon, analyzing the strategies employed, revealing wherever possible the probable sources of his subject's military ideas. The book opens with a brief account of Bonaparte's early years, his military education and formative experiences, and his meteoric rise to the rank of general in the army of the Directory. Introducing the elements of Napoleonic "grand tactics" as they developed in his Italian, Egyptian, and Syrian campaigns, Mr. Chandler shows how these principles were clearly conceived as early as the Battle of Castiglione, when Napoleon was only twenty -six. Several campaigns later, he was Emperor of France, busily constructing the Grande Armée. This great war machine is described in considerable detail: the composition of the armies and the élite Guard; the staff system and the methods of command; the kind of artillery and firearms used; and the daily life of the Grande Armée and the all-seeing and all-commanding virtuoso who presided over every aspect of its operation in the field. As the great machine sweeps into action in the campaigns along the Rhine and the Danube, in East Prussia and Poland, and in Portugal and Spain, David Chandler follows closely every move that vindicates -- or challenges -- the legend of Napoleon's military genius. As the major battles take their gory courses -- Austerlitz, Jena, Fried-land -- we see Napoleon's star reaching its zenith. Then, in the Wagram Campaign of 1809 against the Austrians -- his last real success -- the great man commits more errors of judgment than in all his previous wars and battles put together. As the campaigns rage on, his declining powers seem to justify his own statement: "One has but a short time for war." Then the horrors of the Russian campaign forever shatter the image of Napoleonic invincibility. It is thereafter a short, though heroic and sanguinary, road to Waterloo and St. Helena. Napoleon appears most strikingly in these pages as the brilliant applier of the ideas of others rather than as an original military thinker, his genius proving itself more practical than theoretical. Paradoxically, this was both his chief strength and his main weakness as a general. After bringing the French army a decade of victory, his methods became increasingly stereotyped and, even worse, were widely copied by his foes, who operated against him with increasing effectiveness toward the end of his career. Yet even though his enemies attempted to imitate his techniques, as have others in the last century and a half, no one ever equaled his success. As these meticulous campaign analyses testify, his multifaceted genius was unique. Even as the end approached, as David Chandler points out, his eclipse was "the failure of a giant surrounded by pygmies." "The flight of the eagle was over; the 'ogre' was safely caged at last, and an exhausted Europe settled down once more to attempt a return to former ways of life and government. But the shade of Napoleon lingered on irresistibly for many years after his death in 1821. It lingers yet."

    By the end of the 56-day siege, a determined Viet Minh guerrilla force had destroyed a large, tactical French colonial army in the heart of Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese victory would not only end French occupation of Indochina and offer a sobering premonition of the U.S.'s future military defeat in the region, but would also provide a new model of modern warfare on which size and sophistication didn't always dictate victory.Before his death in Vietnam in 1967, Bernard Fall, a critically acclaimed scholar and reporter, drew upon declassified documents from the French Defense Ministry and interviews with thousands of surviving French and Vietnamese soldiers to weave a compelling account of the key battle of Dien Bien Phu. With maps highlighting the strategic points of conflict, with thirty-two pages of photos, and with Fall's thorough and insightful analysis, Hell in a Very Small Place has become one of the benchmarks in war reportage.

    It was also one of the war's bloodiest and most pivotal battles, whose outcome would shape international politics for decades to come.Cornelius Ryan's compelling account of this final battle is a story of brutal extremes, of stunning military triumph alongside the stark conditions that the civilians of Berlin experienced in the face of the Allied assault. As always, Ryan delves beneath the military and political forces that were dictating events to explore the more immediate imperatives of survival, where, as the author describes it, “to eat had become more important than to love, to burrow more dignified than to fight, to exist more militarily correct than to win.”It is the story of ordinary people, both soldiers and civilians, caught up in the despair, frustration, and terror of defeat. It is history at its best, a masterful illumination of the effects of war on the lives of individuals, and one of the enduring works on World War II.

    To reconstruct the tumultuous hundred days between Yalta and the fall of Berlin, John Toland traveled more than 100,000 miles in twenty-one countries and interviewed more than six hundred people—from Hitler’s personal chauffeur to Generals von Manteuffel, Wenck, and Heinrici; from underground leaders to diplomats; from top Allied field commanders to brave young GIs. Toland adeptly weaves together these interviews using research from thousands of primary sources. When it was first published, The Last 100 Days made history, revealing after-action reports, staff journals, and top-secret messages and personal documents previously unavailable to historians. Since that time, it has come to be regarded as one of the greatest historical narratives of the twentieth century.

    Tow ferocious, excruciating years later, his forces met a final devastating defeat in the frozen streets of Stalingrad. Now this entire campaign has been recreated so accurately and vividly by the author of The Foxes of the Desert that you can hear its noise, feel its exhaustion, gasp at the blunders on both sides, follow every movement of the great armies.

    A Pictoral history of World War II; More than 720 great photographs from World War II

    He intended it, prepared for it, chose the moment for launching it, planned its course, and, on several occasions between 1939 and 1942, claimed to have won it. Although the aims he sought to achieve were old nationalist aspirations, the fact that the policy and strategy for their realization were imposed so completely by Hitler meant that if victory had come, it would have been very much a personal triumph: the ultimate failure was thus a personal one too. This book presents all of Hitler's directives, from preparations for the invasion of Poland (31 August 1939) to his last desperate order to his troops on the Eastern Front (15 April 1945), whom he urges to choke the Bolshevik assault 'in a bath of blood'. They provide a fascinating insight into Hitler's mind and how he interpreted and reacted to events as they unfolded. The book also has detailed notes which link the Fuhrer's orders and explain the consequences of his directives and how the Allies responded to them.

    

    Recording the events of the journey, as well as the sights, miracles, and people that he saw, his account is an important historical and literary, as well as human document.

    In more than 720 great photographs and color pictures (collected from archives all over the world), in a superlative narrative by C. L. Sulzberger, and in dozens of eyewitness accounts -- here is the essence and the drama and the real look of World War II.

    

    Chilling account of a pathfinder unit at the disasterous battle of Arnhem.

    Fall wrote as a journalist & a scholar, backed by credentials that include being the recipient of Fulbright, SEATO & Guggenheim fellowships. This is a collection of his articles from publications including The NY Times Magazine, The Nation, The New Republic & Foreign Affairs. Denying that the war was unavoidable, Fall contends that in their day-to-day decisions, Paris, Saigon & Washington repeatedly ignored vital information & chose the course least likely to produce beneficial long-term results.Introduction1 France loses IndochinaSolution in Indochina (March, 1954) The French communists and Indochina (April, 1955) The failure of the Navarre plan (December, 1956) Representative government in the State of VietNam, 1949-54 (August, 1954) The cease-fire- an appraisal (September, 1954) Settlement at Geneva- then and now (May,1965) 2 The north: two decades of revolutionThe grass-roots rebellion (March,1954) Crisis in the North (January,1957) Inside Hanoi (November, 1962) A contemporary profile (July, 1965)3 The South: stillborn experiment? Religion in politics (July, 1955) Danger signs (May, 1958) The birth of insurgency (July, 1958)The Montagnards (October, 1964) The agonizing reappraisal (February, 1965) The scars of division (July, 1964) 4 The unseen enemyCommunist military tactics (October, 1956)The Viet-Cong (April, 1965) The new communist army (September, 1965)5 The west at bayThe stakes in Southeast Asia (November, 1962)Full circle, 1954-64 (May, 1964) The roots of conflict (January, 1965)6 The second Indochina warThe impersonal war (October, 1965) The statistics of war (July, 1965)The year of the Hawks (December, 1965)Old war, new war (March, 1966)EpilogueBibliographyIndex

    11-7.  On cover: Special Studies. Describes battles on three fronts within the European theater: Arnaville, France; Monte Altuzzo, Italy; and Schmidt, Germany from September through November of 1944. Pictures the difficulties of small unit commanders and soldiers in executing missions assigned by higher headquarters.

    

    Army Historical Series

    Edward Beach's father commanded the Memphis, one of the largest battle cruisers built by the U.S. Navy up to that time--bigger and faster than a battleship. The Memphis (originally Tennessee) was demolished by monstrous tsunami waves in Santo Domingo Harbor in August 1916, killing forty-three sailors, and Beach Jr. literally grew up with the tragedy and its effects, which are as profound today as they were eighty years ago.Based on his father's reminiscences and private papers, official documents, and interviews with survivors, Beach's reexamination of the disaster and his father's court-martial ranks among the finest analyses of the responsibilities and demands placed on the commanding officer of a U.S. Navy ship. A record-setting submarine skipper himself and the acclaimed author of Run Silent, Run Deep, Beach brought personal knowledge to a story that has become a classic in the years since its original publication in 1966. His prose was never more incisive and vigorous. In an introductory essay written for this new edition, Beach discusses the design of the Memphis, her role in the fleet that fought in World War I, and object lessons that have influenced U.S. naval history since the disaster.

    

    

    The conflict began in October 1940, following an Italian ultimatum to the Greek Premier, Metaxus. The Italian forces who marched into the desolate mountain valleys of the Greek-Albanian border just as winter began were badly equipped and badly led, no match in that terrain for the Greek firepower and tactical expertise. The campaign lasted months, until Hitler's legions invaded the balkans from the north next Spring, to wrest a victory for which Mussolini vainly tried to take credit. The grandiose self-deception of Mussolini, imagining himself able to make war - even a minor war - independently of Hitler; the incompetence, short-sightedness and petty ambition of his generals; and the resignation and courage of the rank and file of the Italian army: all point to a theme of brutal contrast in the narrative. The author, a well-known Italian political journalist, makes use for the first time of all the documentary material on the campaign, including memoirs by the chief participants and letters and diaries of ordinary soldiers in the ranks; he has also drawn on Greek sources, including the private diary of Metaxus. His book is not just an objective indictment of Mussolini and many of his lieutenants, but is a valuable contribution to the history of the Second World War.

    In this book, General Moshe Dayan, who masterminded the invasion and commanded the Israeli troops in the field, gives his personal account of the campaign and examines the events leading up it.