As such, it should not be confused with the many abridgements that omit key sections.The book presents lucid descriptions of human mental activity, with detailed considerations of the stream of thought, consciousness, time perception, memory, imagination, emotions, reason, abnormal phenomena, and similar topics. In its course it takes into account the work of Berkeley, Binet, Bradley, Darwin, Descartes, Fechner, Galton, Green, Helmholtz, Herbart, Hume, Janet, Kant, Lange, Lotze, Locke, Mill, Royce, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Wundt, and scores of others. It examines contrasting interpretations of mental phenomena, treating introspective analysis, philosophical interpretations, and experimental research.It remains unsurpassed today as a brilliantly written survey of William James’ timeless view of psychology.

    In addressing them, philosophers have made certain fundamental assumptions-that we can know our own minds by introspection, that most of our thinking about the world is literal, and that reason is disembodied and universal-that are now called into question by well-established results of cognitive science. It has been shown empirically that: Most thought is unconscious. We have no direct conscious access to the mechanisms of thought and language. Our ideas go by too quickly and at too deep a level for us to observe them in any simple way. Abstract concepts are mostly metaphorical. Much of the subject matter of philosophy, such as the nature of time, morality, causation, the mind, and the self, relies heavily on basic metaphors derived from bodily experience. What is literal in our reasoning about such concepts is minimal and conceptually impoverished. All the richness comes from metaphor. For instance, we have two mutually incompatible metaphors for time, both of which represent it as movement through space: in one it is a flow past us and in the other a spatial dimension we move along. Mind is embodied. Thought requires a body-not in the trivial sense that you need a physical brain to think with, but in the profound sense that the very structure of our thoughts comes from the nature of the body. Nearly all of our unconscious metaphors are based on common bodily experiences. Most of the central themes of the Western philosophical tradition are called into question by these findings. The Cartesian person, with a mind wholly separate from the body, does not exist. The Kantian person, capable of moral action according to the dictates of a universal reason, does not exist. The phenomenological person, capable of knowing his or her mind entirely through introspection alone, does not exist. The utilitarian person, the Chomskian person, the poststructuralist person, the computational person, and the person defined by analytic philosophy all do not exist. Then what does? Lakoff and Johnson show that a philosophy responsible to the science of mind offers radically new and detailed understandings of what a person is. After first describing the philosophical stance that must follow from taking cognitive science seriously, they re-examine the basic concepts of the mind, time, causation, morality, and the self: then they rethink a host of philosophical traditions, from the classical Greeks through Kantian morality through modern analytic philosophy. They reveal the metaphorical structure underlying each mode of thought and show how the metaphysics of each theory flows from its metaphors. Finally, they take on two major issues of twentieth-century philosophy: how we conceive rationality, and how we conceive language.

    Hailed as the most outstanding book in the biomedical sciences when it was originally published in 1990, Manic-Depressive Illness was the first to survey this massive body of evidence comprehensively and to assess its meaning for both clinician and scientist. It also vividly portrayed the experience of manic-depressive illness from the perspective of patients, their doctors, and researchers. Encompassing an understanding about the illness as Kraeplin conceived of it- about its cyclical course and about the essential unity of its bipolar and recurrent unipolar forms- the book has become the definitive work on the topic, revered by both specialists and nonspecialists alike. Now, in this magnificent second edition, Drs. Frederick Goodwin and Kay Redfield Jamison bring their unique contribution to mental health science into the 21st century. In collaboration with a team of other leading scientists, a collaboration designed to preserve the unified voice of the two authors, they exhaustively review the biological and genetic literature that has dominated the field in recent years and incorporate cutting-edge research conducted since publication of the first edition. They also update their surveys of psychological and epidemiological evidence, as well as that pertaining to diagnostic issues, course, and outcome, and they offer practical guidelines for differential diagnosis and clinical management. The medical treatment of manic and depressive episodes is described, strategies for preventing future episodes are given in detail, and psychotherapeutic issues common in this illness are considered. Special emphasis is given to fostering compliance with medication regimens and treating patients who abuse drugs and alcohol or who pose a risk of suicide. This book, unique in the way that it retains the distinct perspective of its authors while assuring the maximum in-depth coverage of a vastly expanded base of scientific knowledge, will be a valuable and necessary addition to the libraries of psychiatrists and other physicians, psychologists, clinical social workers, neuroscientists, pharmacologists, and the patients and families who live with manic-depressive illness.